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i :AH STATE \ A;-; COMMISSION 
Respondent Le 'i en j ar 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
-i:dx P e t i t i o n e r ' P l a i n t 1 r i ,\ii\ ix n j ' . ines i um r - j r p o r a t ion 
• ieeks r e v i e w of •* d e c i s i o n of t h e Utah S t a t e L",u„\ ' .c^r : s s i , i 
( " 0 o mm i s s i > . i « f i' n r i - 'i A m i >;' s > r 1 n m t- h a t
 p t o r t h e t a > \ <•- i, 
its property is entitled to the 'UJ, retiu,, ; .in in value ac:: 
county assessed properties oy Utah Cxie Ann, i rierean ec 
§ 5-3-5 --1 J { i < v i'»lified dt LLC.A. j 5^-I-VJ4 ( 1933 
Pursuant to U. -..n. $ 63™,.... - . tncse statutes m i 
rules governing agency action, agency review and judicial 
review that were m effect on December 31, 193"*, govern al 
agency adjudicative proceedings commenced before an agency 
or before December 31, : r?"7 "he hearing before the 
Commission took place ::: June .--4 1987. Tr 
Accordingly, all statutes and rules c*ted in tr. is m e : ar 
~'~ those statutes and rules in effect . •-. "e^ .-erfcer ;1, " : ? ^ 
; toe convenience n:: toe Court Appendix A contains t:ne 
:rerat:ve provisions and lists the current codification of 
one rr:-cic2l = -^*v:tes cited in this brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to U.C.A. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (1983), U.C.A. § 59-1-602(3) (1986) [now 
repealed, see n. 1, supra 1, and Rule 14, R. Utah S. Ct. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether Amax's magnesium manufacturing plant is 
"appurtenant" to a mine within the meaning of U.C.A. § 59-5-3 
(1986) and therefore properly assessed by the State Tax 
Commission, or whether Amax's plant is properly assessed by the 
Tooele county assessor and therefore entitled to the 20% 
reduction embodied in U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 (1986). 
2. Whether, because the Commission's valuation of Amax's 
property relied upon the same comparable sales and cost 
approaches that would have been used by the Tooele county 
assessor, the Commission's refusal to apply the provisions of 
U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 (1986) to Amax's real and tangible personal 
property violates Article XIII, Sections 2(10) and 3(1) of the 
Utah Constitution. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Article XIII, Section 2(10) of the Utah Constitution provides 
in pertinent part: 
Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as 
property or it may be taxed as property in such manner 
and to such extent as the Legislature may provide, but 
if taxed as property the income therefrom shall not also 
be taxed. 
Article XIII, Section 3(1) of the Utah Constitution provides 
in pertinent part: 
- 2 -
The Legislature shall provide by law a unitrr-
 a Pj equal 
rate of assessment on all tangible property m te-
state, according to its value in money, except as 
otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The 
Legislature shall prescribe by law such provisions as 
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such 
property, so that every person and corporation shall pay 
a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its 
tangible property, 
Utah Code Ann ) 9 ] ] (1 9 8 6 ) p r o v i d e s in p e r t i n e n t D ;:I r t: 
All tangible property in this state, not exempt unaer 
the laws of the United States or under the Constitution 
of this state, shall be taxed in proportion to its value 
as hereinafter provided. Intangible property shall be 
exempt from ad valorem assessment, levy and taxation 
Utah Code Ann. § •- ' ^ ^ : ^ , . _ : 
All taxable property, ncr, specifically exe~.pt una^r 
Article XIII, Sec. :, of the Constitution of Utah must 
be assessed at 20% of its reasonacie fair oasn * . .e 
" - O - J ^ I - T - :* :~ . ;ert i ""*:=" *" 
[A] 11 mines anc . .^ ^a.;^ u::i ~ne: v:_a:le 
deposits, including . - , nonmetailiferc^s miner:- s 
underlying land tr.e surface of vhicn is owned by a 
person other than the owner of suon minerals, all 
machinery used m mining and all property or surr'ics 
improvements upon *r *pp.-: * ^ nant to mines or mir.-.r.g 
claims e assessed by the state tix 
commission . . All taxable property net required by 
the Constitution
 wr i-y *-* to be assessed by the state 
tax commission must be assessed by the county assessor 
of the several counties in which the same is situated. 
For the purposes of taxation, all mills reduction 
works, and smelters used exclusively ::r one purpose of 
reducing or smelting the ores from a mine :r mining 
claim by the owner thereof shall be deemed to be 
appurtenant to such mine or mining cla:^ -hough the same 
is not upon such mine ^- -miner claim 
Utah Code Ann. § 5 9-5-4.5(1 • j; IP r; o ,-, ! 
111;: 
When the county assessor uses ti le comparable sales or 
oDst appraisal method in valuing taxable property for 
assessment purposes, the assessor is required to 
recognize that various fees, services, closing costs, 
and other expenses related to the transaction lessen the 
actual amount that may be received in the transaction. 
The county assessor shall, therefore, take 80% of the 
value based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the 
property as its reasonable fair cash value for purposes 
of assessment. 
The full text of U.C.A. §§ 59-1-1, 59-5-1, 59-5-3 and 
59-5-4.5 (1986), as well as the full text of the current codified 
versions of these statutes, is set forth in Appendix A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature Of The Case 
Amax seeks review of a final order of the Utah State Tax 
Commission ("Commission") determining the 1986 assessed value of 
its real and personal property located in Tooele County, Utah. 
The Commission originally assessed the value of Amax's property 
as of January 1, 1986 to be $84,332,150. Pursuant to an informal 
hearing held on August 25, 1986, the Commission reduced the 
2 
assessed value of the property to $78,312,895. Amax thereafter 
petitioned the Commission for a plenary formal hearing on the 
proper market value of its properties. That formal hearing took 
place on June 3 and 4, 1987. Tr. 1, 227. The Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Final Decision of the Commission, which 
further reduced the assessed value of the property by 
2 This adjustment reflected the removal from the tax rolls 
of certain personal property no longer owned by Amax, the 
reduction to salvage value of certain items put in Amax's 
"boneyard," and a correction of certain errors relating to 
materials and supplies. Tr. 148. The propriety of this 
adjustment is not disputed here. 
approximately $5 million, were entered on December 21, 1987. 
3 
Docketing Statement, Appendix 2. The Commission denied a 
timely Petition For Reconsideration by a Decision and Order dated 
May 31, 1988. Docketing Statement, Appendix 1. Amax filed a 
timely petition for review with this Court on June 29, 1983. 
Docketing Statement, Appendix 3. 
II. Statement Of Facts 
This case involves the propriety of the Commission's 
disregard of U.CA. § 59-5-4.5 (1986) in establishing the 
4 
1986 "reasonable fair cash value" of Amax's property. The 
Commission, after using comparable sales and cost approaches (Tr. 
151-152, 155-156) and making the adjustments summarized in notes 
2 and 3 above, set the 1986 "reasonable fair cash value" of 
Amax's property at approximately $78,312,895. In arriving at 
this "reasonable fair cash value," however, the Commission 
declined to apply U.CA. § 59-5-4.5, which requires county 
assessors — but not the Commission — to "take 80% of the value 
3 At the formal hearing, Amax argued that the Commission had 
erroneously concluded that certain costs incurred in 
maintaining Amax's dikes against the rapidly rising waters of 
the Great Sale Lake were capital expenditures rather than 
expenses. Tr. 96-99. These expenses did not add value to 
Amax's holdings, but rather represented efforts to restore 
and maintain the value of its property. Id. The Commission 
held that these costs "are to be expensed and not added to 
the value of the plant." Docketing Statement, Appendix 2 at 
5. The propriety of this reduction in the assessed value of 
Amax's property is not contested here. 
4 Utah C:;e Ann. § 59-5-1 (1986) (*[a]ll taxable property 
. . . must oe assessed at 100% of its reasonable fair cash 
value . . . " ) . 
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based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the property as 
its reasonable fair cash value for purposes of assessment." The 
Commission dismissed Amax's argument that, because its property 
should have been assessed by the Tooele County assessor, Amax was 
entitled to the statutory 20% discount. The Commission also 
rejected Amax's submission that, in light of the fact that the 
Commission used the same comparable sales and cost methods tnat 
would ~ave been used by the Tooele County assessor, the refusal 
to calculate the "reasonable fair cash value" of Amax's property 
under U.C.A- § 59-5-4.5 violated Article XIII, Sections 2(10) and 
3(1) of the Utah Constitution. Both of these conclusions are 
erroneous. 
A. Description Of Amax's Property 
Amax's property consists of (a) a facility for manufacturing 
magnesium, comprised of personal property and improvements on 
land owned by Amax (the "Plant") (Tr. 119-120, Exh. 2), and (b) a 
series of evaporation ponds, comprised of earthen dikes and other 
related equipment, located on land owned by various state and 
federal agencies, the surface of which is leased by Amax (the 
"Ponds"). Id. 
The Plant: The Plant is a large manufacturing facility, 
covering almost a square mile of land, situated in the center of 
approximately seven square miles of land owned in fee by Amax. 
Exh. 2, Tr. 119. Through various chemical and electrical 
processes, the Plant produces magnesium, a metal not found in a 
natural state, from concentrated brine solutions. Tr. 41-4 4. 
- 6 -
The profitability of the Plant is determined by, among other 
things, the availability of an adequate supply of concentrated 
brine and the level of energy costs incurred in the manufacturing 
5 
process. Id. Although the Plant is currently the third 
largest producer of magnesium in the free world (Tr. 140) , it 
has had a troubled financial history. The Plant, in fact, has 
turned a profit only one year since its construction, Tr. 46.' 
The Ponds: The Ponds consist of a series of earthen dikes, 
together with related improvements, located on about 70 square 
miles of state and federal land, the surface of which is leased 
by Amax. Tr. 39. The Ponds, located some 15 miles from the 
Plant, are designed to slowly convert salt water from the Great 
5 Production of magnesium is an energy intensive process. 
Indeed, high electrical costs can be fatal to a magnesium 
manufacturer's profitability. Tr. 41-44; Tr. 140 (magnesium 
plant in Japan shut down as a result of high energy costs). 
Because of this factor, the Plant was originally set for 
construction in the State of Washington to take advantage of 
low hydroelectric energy rates. Tr. 35. Under that plan, 
powdered minerals from the Great Salt Lake would have been 
shipped out of state for ultimate refining. Tr. 35-56. 
Former Governor Calvin Rampton, however, persuaded Amax's 
predecessor to locate the plant in Utah by assuring the 
availability of a power rate comparable to the power rate in 
Washington. Tr. 36-37. 
6 A Dow Chemical plant in Freeport, Texas, and a Norske 
Hydro plant in Norway are the two largest magnesium 
producers. Tr. 140. To Amax's knowledge, only four other 
magnesium plants — located in Canada, Yugoslavia, Brazil and 
France — are currently in operation. Id. 
7 Amax's predecessor, NL Industries, never showed a profit 
from its operation of the Plant. Tr. 46. Amax, which 
purchased the Plant from NL Industries, has lost over $45 
million through 1986. Id. The Plant turned a modest profit 
in 1984, due at least in part to the payment of a $4.7 
million insurance claim. Id. 
- 7 -
Salt Lake into concentrated brine over a seven-year evaporation 
period. Tr. 49, 137. The rising waters of the Great Salt Lake, 
however, have wreaked havoc with the Ponds in recent years. In 
May 1983, high waves resulting from a wind storm breached two 
dikes, contaminating everything but the final concentration pond 
with water from the lake. Tr. 44, 48. Undiluted brine in the 
final concentration pond permitted operation of the Plant through 
1983, but after that date Amax was forced to purchase additional 
brine from out-of-state suppliers. Tr. 48-49. Between 1983 and 
1986, Amax spent over $33 million in an attempt to repair the 
damage done in 1983 and prevent further degradation of the Ponds. 
Tr. 45-46. The effort was unavailing. In June 1986, the dikes 
were again breached, inundating the entire concentration system. 
Tr. 51. As a result, all concentrated brine processed by Amax 
since the 1986 breach has been purchased from third-party 
suppliers and transported to the Plant. Tr. 45, 49. 
B. The Commission's Valuation 
The three traditional indicators of value used to assess real 
and personal property include the "comparable sales" or "market" 
8 9 10 
approach, the "cost" approach, and the "income" approach. 
Tr. 155, 159, 203. The Commission used the cost approach and the 
comparable sales or market approach in determining the value of 
8 Under the "comparable sales" or "market" approach, the 
value of a subject property is determined by comparing that 
property with recent sales of similar property. Tr. 155, 
203. 
9 Under the "cost" approach, an appraiser determines what it 
Footnote cont. 
Q 
Amax's property. Tr. 152, 155. The Commission's assessor 
testified that he did not use the income approach because "since 
the facility has been started, [it] has not been able to produce 
any income . . . ." Tr. 160. 
Specifically, the value of Amax's real property (i.e., the 
land owned in fee upon which the Plant is situated) was set on 
the basis of comparable land values- Tr. 155. The value of 
improvements at the Plant and the Ponds was based upon the cost 
approach using "replacement cost new less depreciation," Tr. 152; 
id. at 155-156, as determined from personal property schedules 
developed by the Property Tax Division. Tr. 151. These 
schedules were developed as a convenient way of applying the 
traditional "cost or market approaches to value." Tr. 207. 
Footnote cont. 
would cost to replace the subject property. That value is 
then reduced by use of a "depreciation table[] to bring the 
value new down to a current value based on the age of the 
asset you're appraising." Tr. 156. 
10 Under the "income" approach, the projected net income of a 
subject property is discounted by a "capitalization rate" to 
determine the value of the property. Tr. 185-187. Various 
factors, including risk, the cost of capital, and the 
expected return on capital, influence the "capitalization 
rate" used in this method. Id. 
11 Although the Property Tax Division personnel sometimes 
used the terms "comparable values" and "market approach" 
rather than the term "comparable sales," even a casual 
reading of the record discloses that they used these terms 
to refer to the traditional appraisal concept of "comparable 
sales." For example, the three traditional appraisal 
approaches to valuation were described by Mr. Sheldon 
Draper, a manager within the Property Tax Division, as the 
"cost, market and income approach." Tr. 203. These three 
approaches are alternatively described in standard appraisal 
texts as "sales comparison, cost, and income 
Footnote cont. 
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Importantly, the Commission's own staff admitted that the 
comparable sales and cost techniques used to value Amax's 
property did not differ from the comparable sales or cost 
methodologies that would have been used by the Tooele County 
assessor. For example, in determining the "cost less 
depreciation7' of Amax's personal property, the Commission staff 
relied upon schedules compiled by the Property Tax Division of 
the State Tax Commission. Tr. 202-203. Mr. Sheldon Draper, 
manager of the section of the Property Tax Division responsible 
for compiling those schedules, testified that those schedules are 
based upon comparable sales and cost data "commonly used by 
appraisers employing the market [or comparable sales] and cost 
12 . . 
approaches to value." Tr. 203 A traditional cost approach 
Footnote cont. 
capitalization." The Appraisal of Real Estate, 70 (9th ed., 
1987) (American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers). See 
n.12, infra. 
12 Mr. Draper's testimony on this point is specific: 
Q [By Mr. Buchi] Is the goal of yourself and those 
working under you in the preparation of the personal 
property schedules to provide an easy means of 
calculating fair market value of personal property, 
those using those schedules? 
A [By Mr. Draper] Yes, it is. 
Q Are you acquainted with the three additional [sic; 
traditional! indicators of value which are commonly used 
to establish fair market value of property? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q What are those three indicators? 
A They are called cost, market [or comparable sales], 
Footnote cont. 
was also used to value the improvements upon Amax's real 
property. Tr. 152. 
As a result, Amax's property would have received the same 
assessed value whether it had been appraised by the Commission or 
the Tooele County Assessor; either party would have used the same 
comparable sale and cost techniques. Indeed, when the Commission 
employee who actually appraised Amax's property was asked whether 
his cost approach would "differ in its basic theory and its 
ultimate goal from the cost approach that [he] would employ if 
[he] were valuing [a county-assessed property such as] the Geneva 
Steel plant," he frankly responded: "I don't think that it 
would." Tr. 152. Thus, the only distinction between an 
appraisal of Amax and Geneva Steel is the formal employment of 
the appraiser by state rather than local government. As a 
county-assessed property, however, Geneva Steel is entitled to a 
20% reduction in the results of a "comparable sales or cost 
appraisal method." U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5. Amax, by contrast, is 
Footnote cont. 
and income approach. 
Q. Do the cost and market approaches to value have any 
application in valuation of personal property? 
A. Yes they do. 
Q. In developing or revising the personal property 
schedules, do you use the same data commonly used by 
appraisers employing the market [or comparable sales] 
and cost approaches to value? 
A. Yes, we do. 
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denied that reduction simply because the Commission — rather 
than a county assessor — is the one who "uses the comparable 
sales or cost appraisal method." Id. 
III. Proceedings Below 
Based on the foregoing, Amax argued that its property was 
properly assessed by Tooele County rather than the Commission. 
Alternatively, Amax asserted that the Commission's refusal to 
apply U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 to the assessed value of Amax's property 
violated Article XIII, Sections 2(10) and 3(1) of the Utah 
Constitution. The first submission was based upon the assertion 
that Amax's holdings were not "property or surface improvements 
upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims," and therefore 
were not properly assessable by the Commission but "must be 
assessed by the county assessor." U.C.A. § 59-5-3 (1986). The 
second submission was based upon the argument that, because both 
the Commission and Tooele County would necessarily use the same 
methodology in valuing Amax's property, refusal to accord Amax's 
real and tangible personal property the 20% reduction granted 
county-assessed real property violated Amax's right to "a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment . . . in proportion to the value of 
. . . its tangible property. . ." and impermissibly taxed Amax's 
intangible property. Article XIII, Sections 2(10) and 3(1), Utah 
Constitution. 
The Commission rejected both submissions. Without extended 
discussion, the Commission simply announced that "the subject 
plant is appurtenant to the mine, i.e., the Great Salt Lake, 
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ponds [sic] from which the minerals were extracted." Docketing 
Statement, Appendix 2 at 4. The Commission therefore concluded 
that Amax was ''subject to central assessment under U.C.A. 
§ 59-5-3." Id.13 
The Commission's discussion of the constitutional issue 
presented here was equally brief (Docketing Statement, Appendix 2 
at 4) : 
Section 59-5-4.5 allows a 20% reduction in market value 
to property which is locally assessed. The language of 
the section does not apply to property which is 
centrally assessed such as the subject property. Such 
non-application of the exemption to the centrally 
assessed property is not unconstitutional. Rio Alaom v. 
San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT AND INTRODUCTION 
Amax is entitled to the benefit of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 on two 
independent grounds. First, Amax's property is neither a "mine" 
nor "appurtenant" to a mine within the meaning of U.C.A. § 59-5-3 
(1986). The Plant, therefore, "must be assessed by the [Tooele] 
county assessor." Id. And, as county-assessed property, Amax is 
entitled to "take 80% of the value based on comparable sales or 
cost appraisal of the [Plant] as its reasonable fair cash value 
for purposes of assessment." U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5. Second, even if 
Amax's property is properly assessable by the Commission, the 
Commission's refusal to apply U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 in calculating the 
13 The Commission has since concluded, however, that Amax's 
Plant should be assessed by Tooele County for 1987 and 
subsequent years. See Tr. 146. Indeed, Tooele county 
contracted with the staff of the Division of Property 
Taxation to perform the 1987 and subsequent appraisals on 
behalf of the county. 
- 13 -
''reasonable fair cash value" of Amax's property violates 
Article XIII, Sections 2(10) and 3(1) of the Utah Constitution. 
The Constitution and implementing statutes guarantee Amax "a 
uniform and equal rate of assessment" and forbid taxation of 
intangible property. Utah Const, art. XIII, §§ 2(10), 3(1); 
U.C.P- § 59-1-1 (1986). These guarantees are violated where, as 
here, a taxpayer is denied a 20% reduction in the assessed value 
of its property solely because a state — rather than a county --
employee "uses the comparable sales or cost appraisal method in 
valuing taxable property." U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AMAX IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 
BECAUSE ITS PROPERTY MUST BE LOCALLY ASSESSED 
By its own terms, U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 applies any time "the 
comparable sales or cost appraisal method" is used by a "county 
assessor" in "valuing taxable property." The value of Amax's 
property has been calculated by means of cost and comparable sales 
methods. Tr. 152, 155-156. Amax, therefore, is entitled to the 
20% reduction established by U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 if its property is 
properly assessable by Tooele County rather than the Commission. 
Straightforward application of U.C.A. § 59-5-3 (1986) demonstrates 
beyond doubt that Amax's property must be assessed by Tooele 
County, 
Section 59-5-3 enumerates the specific categories of property 
to be assessed by the Commission. Among these categories are (1) 
14 Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1 (1986). 
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"all mines and mining claims," (2) "all property or surface 
improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims," and 
(3) any property "deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or mining 
claim" because it is "used exclusively for the purpose of reducing 
or smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by the owner 
thereof." U.C.A. § 59-5-3. Amax's property cannot be centrally 
assessed under this scheme: the property is not a "mine'1 or 
"appurtenant" to a mine," nor can it be "deemed" appurtenant to a 
mine owned by Amax. It is, therefore, properly assessable by 
Tooele County. Id. ("[a]11 taxable property not required by the 
Constitution or by law to be assessed by the state tax commission 
must be assessed by the county assessor of the several counties in 
15 
which the same is situated"). 
A. Amax's Property Is Not A "Mine" Or "Mining Claim" 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-3-1(8) (1986)16 defines a "mine" as "a 
natural deposit of . . . valuable mineral." "Mining claim" is not 
defined and must be presumed to have been used to describe mining 
claims initiated under federal law. The Plant is not located on 
the Great Salt Lake or on the Ponds, The Plant, instead, is built 
15 In addition to mines and mining claims, U.C.A. § 59-5-3 
also requires central assessment of various other types of 
property, such as pipelines, power lines, canals and public 
utilities. These categories of centrally assessed 
properties are irrelevant to the present case. 
16 Now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(6). 
17 The General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21, et sea. 
(1980), authorizes the initiation of "mining claims" on 
certain federal lands — claims which are generally 
recognized under Utah law. See U.C.A. §§ 40-1-1, et seq. 
Footnote cont. 
- 15 -
on a separate parcel of land owned, in fee, by Amax. The Plant 
site contains no "natural deposit" of any "valuable mineral." 
U.C.A. § 59-3-1(3) (1986). Amax extracts no mineral from the 
Plant site. Tr. 131, 329. Similarly, the Ponds are not located 
on the lake but on separate parcels of land, the surface of which 
is leased by Amax from the state and federal gc.ernments. T. 39 
The site of the Ponds contains no "natural deposit" of any 
"valuable mineral." U.C.A. § 59-3-1(8) (1986). Even if it did, 
Amax has no rights under its surface use leases to any such 
deposit. Moreover, neither Amax's rights to the fee parcel of 
land under the Plant nor to the surface of the leased parcel of 
land under the Ponds are "mining claims," either under federal law 
or under any other conceivable usage of that term. 
The only "natural deposit" of a "valuable mineral" located 
anywhere in the general vicinity of the Plant or the Ponds is the 
Great Salt Lake itself. Both the lake and all dissolved minerals 
in the waters of the lake, however, are exclusively owned by the 
state of Utah. Morton International, Inc. v. Southern Pacific 
Transportation Co.. 27, Utah 256, 495 P.2d 31, 32-34 (1972); See 
also. Hardy Salt Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 501 
F.2d n.56 (10th Cir. 1974). Amax has only "a nonexclusive right 
to extract and process" minerals in the lake waters sold to it by 
the state on a royalty basis. U.C.A. § 65-1-15(3) (1986) (now 
Footnote cont. 
See also n. 19 and the accompanying text below for a 
discussion of the requirement that statutory terms be 
interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meanings. 
codified at U.C.A. § 65A-6-l(3).) Accordingly, Amax is not the 
owner of "a mine or mining claim" assessable by the Commission." 
B. Amax's Property Is Not "Appurtenant" To A "Mine" 
within The Meaning Of U.C.A, § 59-5-3 
Although neither the Plant nor the Ponds are a "mine" or 
"mining claim," they can be centrally assessed if they are 
"appurtenant" to a mine. U.C.A. § 59-5-3. The Commission 
concluded, in a single sentence, that "[f]or 1936 the subject 
plant is appurtenant to the mine, i.e., the Great Salt Lake, ponds 
[sic] from which the minerals were extracted." Docketing 
Statement, Appendix 2 at 4. This conclusion is ambiguous at best. 
If the Commission intended to find that the mine to which the 
Plant is appurtenant is the Great Salt Lake, Amax is not the owner 
18 Assuming arguendo that the Great Salt Lake constitutes a 
"mine," it conceivably could be argued that Amax's equipment 
located at the Ponds, or even the Plant itself, is 
"machinery used in mining" assessable by the Commission. 
U.C.A. § 59-5-3(1)(d) (1986) (now codified at U.C.A. 
§ 59-2-201(1)(d).) This argument would be based upon the 
definition of "mining" as "the process of producing, 
extracting, leaching, evaporating, or otherwise removing a 
mineral from a mine." U.C.A. § 59-3-1(9) (1986) (now 
codified at U.C.A. § 59-2-102(7). The argument, however, 
proves too much because it would lead to the anomalous 
result that virtually all equipment utilized by Geneva Steel 
— as well as by all oil refineries in the state — is 
"machinery used in mining." (Geneva, the various refineries 
in the state, and Amax all take minerals that are physically 
extracted elsewhere by "mining," transport them to their 
property, store them on their property, and manufacture them 
into products not found in nature — steel, petroleum 
distillates, and magnesium.) This argument would also, as 
more particularly discussed sections I.B. and I.e. below, 
render superfluous the additional statutory provisions 
requiring the Commission to assess property "appurtenant" or 
"deemed appurtenant" to a mine or mining claim, since all 
property involved in "mining" would automatically be 
assessable by the Commission. 
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of the mine. If the Commission intended to find that the nine is 
the Ponds, no "natural deposit" of a "valuable mineral" is located 
under the Ponds. Either conclusion is legally erroneous for the 
reasons discussed in the immediately preceeding section. 
Even if it is assumed for the sake of discussion that either 
the Great Salt Lake or the Ponds is a "mine," the Commission's 
bald declaration that the Plant is "appurtenant to the mine" is 
legally unsupportable. The plain meaning of the term 
"appurtenant," its consistent interpretation by courts throughout 
the country, and the Utah legislature's knowledgeable use of the 
term in U.C.A. § 59-5-3 and other statutes demonstrate the fallacy 
of the Commission's conclusion, 
1. Plain meaning of "appurtenant". 
The words used in U.C.A. § 59-5-3 — and particularly the term 
of art "appurtenant" — must be interpreted and applied in a 
manner consistent with "their usually accepted meanings." Bd. of 
Educ. of Granite Sch. v. Salt Lake Ctv.. 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 
19 1983). According to Black's Law Dictionary 94 (5th ed. 1979) 
(emphasis added): 
[a] thing is 'appurtenant' to something else when it 
stands in relation of an incident to a principal and is 
19 Accord, Utah County v. Orem Citv, 699 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 
1985) ("It is a well-established rule of statutory 
construction that the terms of a statute should be 
interpreted in accord with usually accepted meanings"); 
Grant v. Utah State Land Board. 485 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Utah 
1971) ("Foundational rules require that we assume that each 
term of a statute was used advisedly; and that each should 
be given an interpretation and application in accord with 
their usually accepted meaning, unless the context otherwise 
requires") (footnote omitted). 
necessarily connected with the use and enjoyment of the 
latter. A thing is deemed to be incidental or 
appurtenant to land when it is by right used with the 
land for its benefit. 
A similar definition is found in tne Dictionary of Real Estate 
Appraisers 16 (1984) (American Institute of Real Estate 
Appraisers), which defines an appurtenance as "[s]omething that 
has been added or appended to a property and has become an 
inherent part of the property; usually passes with the property 
20 
when title is transferred." Even the layman's definition of 
"appurtenant" is in accord. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 98 (1985) defines an "appurtenance" as "an incidental 
right (as a right-of-way) attached to a principal property right 
21 
and passing in possession with it." 
None of the above "usually accepted meanings" (Bd. of Educ. of 
Granite Sch. v. Salt Lake Cty., supra, 659 P.2d at 1035) support 
the Commission's conclusion that the Plant is "appurtenant" to the 
Great Salt Lake or the Ponds. The Plant is not an "incident" of 
20 See also 2 Tiffany, The Law Of Real Property And Other 
Interests In Land § 448 (1920): 
The word "appurtenance" is properly confined to things of 
an incorporeal character, such as easements or profits a 
prendre, and a conveyance of land "with the 
appurtenances" will not pass land other than that 
described, on the theory that it is appurtenant thereto, 
or, as the rule is usually expressed, "land cannot be 
appurtenant to land." 
21 Webster's defines "appurtenant" as "constituting a legal 
accompaniment." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 
98 (1985). 
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the lake and/or Ponds, nor is it "necessarily connected with the 
use and enjoyment" of the Ponds. Black's Law Dictionary at 94. 
The Plant is near the lake and the Ponds, but that fortuitous 
proximity is not mandated by any exigency in the manufacture of 
magnesium. Indeed, the Plant was to have been built in the 
Pacific Northwest to take advantage of low energy costs. Tr. 35. 
The Plant was built in Utah only after concessions offered by 
public utilities and state and local government officials made it 
economically feasible to locate the Plant in Utah. Tr. 35-37. 
Thus, it would be more appropriate, although still incorrect, to 
argue that the Ponds are an "incident" of or are for "the use and 
enjoyment" of the Plant. The Ponds have been used for the benefit 
of the Plant — not the other way around. 
The remaining definitions of "appurtenant" display even more 
clearly the absurdity of treating the Plant as an "appurtenance" 
of the Great Salt Lake and/or the Ponds. Amax's ownership of the 
Plant, of course, did not arise "by right" of its nonexclusive 
agreement to purchase brines from the Great Salt Lake from the 
state of Utah on a royalty basis, nor from its state or federal 
surface use leases of the land under the Ponds. Blacks Law 
Dictionary at 94. The Plant is not "an inherent part" of either 
the royalty/purchase agreement with the state of Utah nor its 
state and federal surface use leases. Nor would title to the 
Plant pass with the sale or transfer of either the 
royalty/purchase agreement or the surface use leases. 
Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal at 16. The Plant, in short, 
is not an "incidental right" that "pass[es] in possession with" 
the lake or Ponds. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary at 
98. The Plant, therefore, is not legally ''appurtenant" to the 
23 lake or the Ponds. 
2. Judicial construction of "appurtenant". 
The foregoing definitions of "appurtenant" are derived from a 
consistent line of judicial opinions interpreting the term. There 
22 Indeed, Amax subsequently sold its rights to a portion of 
the Ponds to a third party. Neither Amax nor the third 
party claimed that this sale included title to the Plant as 
an "appurtenance" to the Ponds. 
23 Although there is no discussion supporting the 
Commission's order, the conclusion that the Plant rs 
"appurtenant" to the Great Salt Lake must be based simply 
upon the proximity of the Plant to the lake. The Property 
Tax Division, in fact, argued below that the "word 
'appurtenant' [in U.C.A. § 59-5-3] should be understood to 
mean 'adjacent' or 'adjunct'" because the lake, Ponds and 
Plant "cannot pass as 'appurtenances' (as that term is 
ordinarily understood in real estate) . . . ." Post Hearing 
Brief of Respondent at 20-21. The Division, therefore, 
effectively conceded that the Plant is not legally 
"appurtenant" to the lake or Ponds. The Division, however, 
attempted to escape the consequences of this concession by 
asserting that "appurtenant" should be construed as 
"synonymous" with such terms as "adjunct," "annexed to," and 
"adjacent." Id. at 20. Such reasoning is unsound. 
Equating "appurtenant" with "adjunct" or "adjacent" would 
transform myriads of highways and commercial facilities into 
"appurtenances" of the Great Salt Lake. Moreover, as shown 
in Section I.B.(3) below, there is no indication that the 
Utah legislature intended to adopt such an expansive reading 
of a well-known, common law term. On the contrary, the 
legislature provided a specific "deemed appurtenant" 
provision to cover circumstances outside the common law 
sweep of "appurtenant." 
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are, indeed, myriads of cases — from Utah and other states — 
which construe "appurtenant" consistently with the definitions set 
out above. These judicial pronouncements generally follow the 
24 E.g., Roundy v. Coombs, 668 P.2d 550 (Utah 1983) (water 
rights appurtenant to land); Utah State Road Commission v. 
Miva. 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974) (rights of access, light and 
air appurtenant to land) ; Aspen Acres Ass'n v. Seven Assoc, 
Inc., 508 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1973) (easement appurtenant to 
land); Amoss v. Bennion, 456 P.2d 172 (Utah 1969) (mineral 
rights appurtenant to land). 
25 E.g., Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U.S. 304, 314 (1891) 
(the term "appurtenant" involves the idea of dependence, and 
includes easements and servitudes used and enjoyed with the 
lands for whose benefit they were created); Denver Center 
for Performing Arts v. Briggs, 696 P.2d 299, 307 (Colo. 
1985) ("appurtenances" generally refers to intangible 
rights, such as water rights or easements, that necessarily 
must be conveyed for beneficial use of land); Smith v. 
Harris, 311 P.2d 325, 333-334, (Kan. 1957) (an 
"appurtenance" is something belonging to another thing as 
principal and passing as incident to it); Owsley /. Hamner, 
227 P.2d 263, 267 (Ca. 1951) (en banc)( "appurtenance" 
includes everything reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of 
the interest conveyed as an incident to it); Von Rohr v. 
Neelv, 173 P.2d 828, 829 (Cal. 1946) (a thing is 
"appurtenant" to something else when it stands in the 
relation of an incident to and is necessarily connected with 
the use and enjoyment of the principal . . . and agreeing in 
its nature and quality with the thing to which it is 
appendant or appurtenant); La Rue v. Greene County Bank, 166 
S.W.2d 1044, 1047 (Tenn. 1942) ("appurtenance" means that 
which belongs to something else, or something belonging to 
another thing as principal and passing as incident to it, as 
a right of way or other easement to land); Szilagy v. 
Taylor, 25 N.E.2d 360, 361 (Ohio 1939) (an "appurtenance" is 
an article adapted to the use of the property to which it is 
connected, and which was intended to be a permanent 
accession to the freehold); Alwes v. Richheimer, 47 S.W.2d 
1084, 1085 (Ark. 1932) (an "appurtenance" is a thing 
belonging to another thing as a principal which passes as 
incident to the principal thing); Joplin Waterworks Co. v. 
Jasper County. 38 S.W.2d 1068, 1076 (Mo. 1931) 
("appurtenances" are things belonging to another thing as 
principal, and which pass as incident to the principal 
thing; a thing used with and related to or dependent upon 
something else which is its principal); In re Eastern 
Footnote cont. 
early, authoritative exposition of the term "appurtenant" by the 
Supreme Court in Harris et at. v. Elliott, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 25, 
53 (1336) : 
This tern, both in common parlance and in legal 
acceptation, is used to signify something appertaining to 
another thing as principal, and which passes as an 
incident to the principal thing. Lord Coke says (Coke 
Lit. 121, b), a thing corporeal cannot properly be 
appurtenant to a thing corporeal, nor a thing incorporeal 
to a thing incorporeal. According to this rule, land 
cannot be appurtenant to land . . . . [I]t would be 
absurd, to allow the fee of one piece of land, not 
mentioned in the deed, to pass as appurtenant to another 
distinct parcel, which is expressly granted by precise 
and definite boundaries. 
See also Washington Medical Center, Inc. v. United States, 545 
F.2d 116, 127 (Ct. CI. 1976) (quoting Harris v. Elliott, supra). 
The proper judicial construction of the term "appurtenant" is 
demonstrated by Balcar v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., 193 S.W. 1094 
(Tex. App. 1917) , where, on facts analogous to this case, the 
court held that a warehouse was not "appurtenant" to a factory. 
Footnote cont. 
Boulevard in Borough of the Bronx, City of New York, 24 3 
N.Y.S. 57, 61 (App. Div. 1930) (land cannot pass as 
"appurtenant" to land except in case of land under water); 
Mt. Carmel Fruit Co. v. Webster, 73 P. 826, 828 (Cal. 1903) 
(a thing is deemed to be incidental or "appurtenant" to land 
when it is by right used with the land for its benefit, as 
in the case of a way or watercourse, or of a passage for 
light, air or heat from or across the land of another); 
McClenaahan v. McEachern. 34 S.E. 627, 628 (S.C. 1899) (the 
word "appurtenant" necessarily involves the idea that the 
owner of a dominant tenement has some legal right in the 
premises appurtenant to it); Kingswav R. & M. Corp. v. 
Kingswav Repair Corp., 228 N.Y.S. 265 (App. Div. 1928) (an 
appurtenance does not include an interest in adjoining lands 
owned by landlord, since land never passes as appurtenance 
to land; word "appurtenance" signifies anything that is an 
incident of and belongs to some other thinr as a principal 
. . . * j 
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There, a company operating a cottonseed oil plant executed a deed 
of trust conveying its factory to the trustee "together with all 
and singular the rights and appurtenances to the same belonging or 
in any wise incident or appertaining." 193 S.W. at 1094. Upon 
foreclosure, the purchaser at the trustee's sale argued that a 
seedhouse — erected by the cottonseed company on land some miles 
away from the factory — was "appurtenant" to the property covered 
by the deed of trust. The court rejected this assertion, 
reasoning that an "appurtenance" is "[a] thing belonging to 
another thing as principal, and which passes as incident to the 
principal thing." 193 S.W. at 1095. The court concluded that 
there was no such relationship between the factory and a seedhouse 
built upon a separate parcel of land. "Certainly no one reading 
the description as set forth in the deed of trust upon which 
appellee's right is based could reasonably conclude that a 
seedhouse a number of miles in the country could be held to be an 
appurtenance to the lots . . . upon which the oil mill was 
situated." Id. 
Similar reasoning compels an identical result here. Surely no 
one reading Amax's state and federal leases or its nonexclusive 
royalty/purchase agreement with the state could reasonably 
conclude that a magnesium manufacturing facility, located on land 
owned in fee miles away from the Ponds and the lake "could be held 
to be an appurtenance to the [leases] . . . upon which the [Ponds 
are] situated" or to the lake from which the brines are purchased. 
Balcar v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., supra. 193 S.W. at 1095. 
Indeed, the conclusion that the Plant is not an appurtenance of 
the lake or the Ponds follows a fortiori from Balcar: If a 
warehouse located on a separate parcel of land does not pass as an 
appurtenance to a nearby factory, surely a factory owned in fee 
could never pass as an appurtenance to a separate parcel of leased 
land or a state-owned lake. To paraphrase the United States 
Supreme Court, it would be "absurd" to treat the fee title to the 
Plant as appurtenant to Amax's leasehold rights "expressly granted 
by precise and definite boundaries." Harris et al. v. Elliott. 
supra, 35 U.S. (10 Pet. ) at 53.26 
3. Legislative usage of "appurtenant". 
The foregoing perhaps could be dismissed if the Utah 
legislature, in enacting U.C.A. § 59-5-3, clearly intended to 
2 6 Accord, Bowlin v. Federated Mutual Implement & H. Ins. 
Co., 357 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1962) (a building on one parcel 
of land is not appurtenant to an adjacent parcel of land); 
Givens v. Louisville Property Co.'s Assignee, 81 S.W.2d 401, 
402 (Ky. 1935) (forfeiture provision in coal mining lease 
entitling lessor to enter and take possession of leased 
property and "appurtenances" did not authorize the lessor to 
take possession of adjoining land leased by the lessee and 
used in connection with operation of the coal mine); 
Kinaswav R. & M. Corp. v. Kinaswav Repair Cor., 228 N.Y.S. 
265, 268 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1928) ("An appurtenance to a lease . . . 
does not include an interest in adjoining lands, even though 
owned by a common owner, 'since land never passes as 
appurtenant to land."); Rutherford v. Wabash R. Co., 48 S.W. 
921, 924 (Mo. 1898) (where a group of buildings on one's 
land, constituting his coal-mining plant, extended over the 
right of way of a railroad company by means of sheds and a 
chute over them, the mining buildings cannot be said to be 
appurtenant to them, within the provision of a lease of a 
right of way agreeing to hold a railroad company harmless 
from damages by fire to any building on the leased premises 
or their appurtenances). 
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adopt a definition of "appurtenant" that diverged from the 
accepted common law meaning. cf. Home v. Home, 737 P. 2d 244, 
243 (Utah App. 1987) ("Statutes are not to be construed as 
effecting any change in the common law beyond that which is 
clearly indicated.") The available evidence, however, 
demonstrates that the Utah legislature was well acquainted with -
and did not intend to deviate from — the accepted, well-known 
construction of "appurtenant." 
To begin with, the legislature has undoubtedly adopted the 
common law meaning of "appurtenant" in other statutes 
incorporating the term. For example, U.C.A. §§ 57-1-12, -13, -14 
and -19(5) each provide that all warranty deeds, quitclaim deeds, 
mortgages, and trust deeds are presumed to convey or encumber not 
only the land expressly described therein, but also "all the 
appurtenances thereunto belonging." Similarly, U.C.A. §§ 73-1-10 
and -11 contemplate that all water and water rights "appurtenant 
to land shall pass to the grantee of such land." These statutes 
were obviously written with the generally accepted meaning of 
"appurtenant" in mind. See, e.g., Abbott v. Christensen, 660 P.2 
254 (Utah 1983). Otherwise, every conveyance could be held to 
transfer, not only the specifically described property, but also 
any other "nearby" property owned by the grantor. The 
legislature, in providing for the conveyance of "appurtenances" i 
these statutes, clearly understood — and did not deviate from — 
the standard definitions set out in Sections IB(1), (2), above. 
More important, however, is the structural indication — drawn 
from the statute itself — that the legislature was aware of the 
common law meaning of "appurtenant" when it enacted U.C.A. 
§ 59-5-3. In drafting U.C.A. § 59-5-3, the legislature not only 
provided for central assessment of property "appurtenant" to 
mines, the legislature also provided for central assessment of 
property that it "deemed" to be appurtenant because "used 
exclusively for the purpose of reducing or smelting the ores from 
a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof." Id. The only way 
to give effect to the "deemed appurtenant" provision of U.C.A. 
§ 59-5-3 is to restrict the term "appurtenant" to its common law 
context. 
The legislature included a "deemed appurtenant" provision in 
U.C.A. § 59-5-3 in the precise circumstances where it decided to 
reach beyond the common law sweep of "appurtenant." The 
Commission's broad reading of the term "appurtenant," however, 
renders this legislative "deemed appurtenant" provision 
superfluous. According to the Commission, a facility is 
"appurtenant" if it is "nearby," "related to" or "beneficial" to a 
27 
mine. But, if the Commission is correct, there would never be 
a need to invoke the legislative "deemed appurtenant" provision. 
27 The Property Tax Division of the State Tax Commission 
urged below that, "the question is not whether the AMAX 
property is used exclusively to serve the mining claims in 
the Great Salt Lake, but rather whether or not the AMAX 
manufacturing property was designed used [sic] to benefit 
the mine or mining claims." Pre-Hearing Brief of Respondent 
at 4. 
- 27 
Why? Because all ''mills, reduction works, and smelters" used for 
the "purpose of reducing or smelting the ores from a mine or 
mining claim by the owner thereof" (U.C.A. § 59-5-3) would 
2 8 
certainly be "nearby," "related to" or "beneficial" to the mine 
and thereby already within the sweep of the simple term 
"appurtenant." This would be so, moreover, regardless of whether 
— as the legislature expressly provided — such use was 
"exclusive[ ] ." idk. at 4. 
The Commission's overbroad construction of the term 
"appurtenant," therefore, not only ignores the usually accepted 
meaning of the term, it also renders the legislature's express 
inclusion of a "deemed appurtenant" provision meaningless. Such a 
result contravenes both legislative intent and accepted principles 
29 
of statutory construction. The fact that the legislature 
expressly included a deemed appurtenant provision in U.C.A. 
§ 59-5-3 to cover property not legally appurtenant to a mine 
demonstrates beyond doubt that the legislature was aware of — and 
28 Pre-Hearing Brief of Respondent at 3. 
29 Ward v. Richfield Citv. 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984) (the 
context of a statute must be considered in determining the 
meaning given its terms); Sinclair Refining Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 130 P.2d 663, 664 (1942) (same); Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 
1984) ("[S]eparate parts of an act should not be construed 
in isolation from the rest of the act"); Millett v. Clark 
Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980) (statutory 
enactments "are to be construed so as to render all parts 
thereof relevant and meaningful"); Horman v. Liquor Control 
Commission, 445 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1968) (same). 
indeed adopted — the common law parameters of the term 
"appurtenant." 
C. Amax's Property Is Not Within The "Deemed 
Appurtenant" Provision Of the Utah Statute 
Because neither the Plant nor the Ponds is a "mine" or "mining 
claim" and neither is legally "appurtenant" to a mine or mining 
claim, they may be centrally assessed only if they fit within the 
"deemed appurtenant" provision of U.C.A. § 59-5-3. They do not. 
"[M]ills, reduction works, and smelters" are "deemed 
appurtenant" to a mine or mining claim when they are "used 
exclusively for the purpose of reducing or smelting the ores from 
a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof." U.C.A. § 59-5-3. 
The Plant, but not the Ponds, qualifies as a "mill, reduction 
works or smelter." Id. The only question, therefore, is whether 
the Plant is used "exclusively" to reduce or smelt minerals from a 
mine owned by Amax. 
This Court has "recognize[d] the strictness of the plain 
meaning of 'used exclusively.'" Loval Order of Moose No. 259 v. 
County Bd. of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah 1982).30 An 
30 At one time this Court interpreted the word "exclusively," 
as used in the statutory phrase "used exclusively for 
charitable purposes," to mean "dominantly" or "primarily." 
Salt Lake Lodge No. 85, B.P.O.E. v. Groesbeck. 120 P. 192 
(Utah 1911). That definition, however, allowed the tax 
exemption for charitable institutions "to drift from the 
verbal moorings of the Constitution." Loval Order of Moose, 
#259 v. County Board of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 266 
(Utah 1982) (Oaks, J., concurring). Accordingly, in Loyal 
Order of Moose, the Court returned the terra "exclusively" to 
its ordinary meaning. 657 P.2d at 262-264. 
The Property Tax Division asserted below that the term 
Footnote cont. 
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"exclusive use" is "one which is singly or solely devoted." id. 
Prior to 1984, the Plant was used solely to process minerals from 
the Ponds, to the exclusion of materials from all other sources. 
Beginning in 1984, however, and continuing in all subsequent 
years, the Plant has processed brine purchased from sources other 
than the Ponds. Tr. 49. Consequently, it has not "exclusively" 
processed brine from the Ponds since 1983. Finally, even if the 
the Commission's creative definition of the term "exclusive" were 
to be accepted, Amax would still not be the "owner" of the lake 
("mine") from which the minerals processed by the Plant were 
extracted. Morton International, Inc. v. Southern Pacific 
Transportation Co., 27, Utah 256, 495 P.2d 31, 32-34 (1972); 
U.C.A. § 65-1-15(3) (1986) (now codified at U.C.A. § 65A-6-l(3). 
Footnote cont. 
"exclusively" in U.C.A, § 59-5-3 actually means "primarily." 
That argument, of course, was rejected by this Court in 
Loyal Order of Moose, supra, 657 P.2d at 262-264. Moreover, 
the legislature has recently amended U.C.A. § 59-5-3 to 
replace the word "exclusively" with the term "primarily" 
effective January 1, 1988. Compare U.C.A. § 59-5-3 (1986) 
with U.C.A. § 59-2-301 (1988). This amendment evidences a 
legislative awareness of the fact that, for tax years prior 
to 1988, the test for determining whether property is 
"deemed appurtenant" to a mine is one of exclusivity. 
31 For decisions from other states defining "exclusively" as 
"only," "solely," "purely," "wholly," and "to the exclusion 
of all other things," see In re Cessna Employees' Flying 
Club, 721 P.2d 298, 300-301 (Kan. App. 1986); South Dakota 
Auto. Club, Inc. v. Volk, 305 N.W.2d 693, 700 (S.D. 1981); 
Citv of Nevada v. Bastow, 328 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Mo. App. 1959); 
Ground Water Conservation Dist. No. 2 v. Hawlev, 304 S.W.2d 
764, 770 (Tex. App. 1957). 
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Amax's property is therefore not assessable by the Commission 
3 2 
under the "deemed appurtenant" provision of U.C.A. § 59-5-3. 
The Commission seriously misconstrued the plain language of 
the last sentence of U.C.A, § 59-5-3. The purpose of that 
sentence is to "deem" certain property to be "appurtenant" to a 
mine, thereby giving the Commission authority to assess that 
property, if the property is used "exclusively" to process ores 
and minerals "from a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof." 
U.C.A. § 59-5-3. (Thus assuring, for example, that the Kennecott 
smelter, which is not "upon" or legally "appurtenant" to a mine, 
will nevertheless be subject to central assessment because it is 
used "exclusively" to process ores from the Bingham Canyon mine.) 
However, if a mill or other manufacturing facility is not used 
"exclusively" to refine minerals mined by the owner of the mill, 
the mill will escape the "deemed appurtenance" provision and will 
be subject to local assessment. The sentence thus permits owners 
of mills and smelters who — like Amax and Geneva Steel — do not 
"exclusively" process their own minerals to avoid central 
assessment. It does not, as the Commission apparently reasoned, 
3 2 In a somewhat confused reference to the "deemed 
appurtenant" provision of U.C.A. § 59-5-3, the Commission 
wrote (Docketing Statement, Appendix 2 at 4-5): 
If the plant were used exclusively to produce magnesium 
from brine purchased from outside suppliers it would not 
be appurtenant to the mine from which the minerals were 
extracted, and it would be subject to assessment by 
local authorities. 
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subject the owner of such a facility to central assessment unless 
it "exclusively" refines raw materials purchased elsewhere. 
In enacting U.C.A. § 59-5-3, the Utah legislature provided 
that mines and mining claims, properties "appurtenant" to mines or 
mining claims, and properties "deemed appurtenant" by reason of 
their exclusive use "by the owner" of a mine or mining claim 
should be centrally assessed. This Court must "assume that each 
term in the statute was used advisedly" and "interpret[] and 
aPPl[y] t h e statute according to its literal wording." Home v. 
Home. 737 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah App. 1987). Accord, West Jordan v. 
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). Amax's Plant does not 
fall within the literal wording of any applicable category of 
centrally assessed property and therefore should have been 
33 
assessed by the Tooele county assessor. As a locally assessed 
property, Amax is entitled to "take 80% of the value based on 
comparable sales or cost appraisal of the property as its 
reasonable fair cash value for purposes of assessment." U.C.A. 
§ 59-5-4.5. The Commission's contrary conclusion must be 
reversed. 
II. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-5-4.5 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AS APPLIED TO THE ASSESSMENT OF AMAX'S PROPERTY 
Amax argued below that, even if it were appropriate to 
centrally assess its property (which it is not), the Commission 
3 3 Indeed, even the Commission now recognizes that, beginning 
in tax year 1987, the Plant must be assessed by Tooele 
County. See Tr. 14 6. 
would be required to use U.C.A, § 59-5-4.5 in computing the 
34 
property's "reasonable fair cash value." The Commission 
rejected this submission on the grounds that U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 
"does not apply to property which is centrally assessed" and 
"[s]uch non-application of the exemption to the centrally assessed 
property is not unconstitutional. Rio Alaom v. San Juan County, 
681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984)." Docketing Statement, Appendix 2 at 4. 
Contrary to the conclusion of the Commission, however, this 
Court's decision in Rio Alaom does not uphold the 
constitutionality of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 as applied to Amax's 
property. Indeed, the principles enunciated in that opinion 
demonstrate that refusal to apply U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 in calculating 
the "reasonable fair cash value" of Amax's property violates 
Amax's right to "a uniform and equal rate of assessment" of its 
tangible property "according to its value in money." Utah Const. 
art. XIII, § 3(1). Moreover, U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 must be applied to 
Amax's property to avoid improper taxation of intangible property. 
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(10). 
A. This Court's Decision In Rio Alaom Does Not 
Dispose Of The Constitutional Challenge Here 
In Rio Alaom Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1984), this Court upheld U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 against a 
challenge that the statute was "facially unconstitutional." 681 
P.2d at 187. That decision, however, does not control the 
disposition of this case. Rio Alaom was decided without a factual 
34 Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1 (1986). 
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record. 631 P.2d at 137. This case, by contrast, comes before 
the Court with a record demonstrating the actual operation of 
U.c.A. § 59-5-4.5. The record, furthermore, unequivocally 
demonstrates that, instead of promoting "a uniform and equal rate 
of assessment on all tangible property . . . according to its 
value in money" (Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)), U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 
— as applied to Amax's property — "establishes] [a] formal 
classification[] of property that result[s] in nonuniform or 
disproportionate tax burdens." Rio Alaom, 681 P.2d at 193. 
The plaintiffs in Rio Alaom "adduced no evidence of actual 
nonuniformity in the tax assessments of state-assessed properties 
as compared with county-assessed properties." 681 P.2d at 193. 
The case, in fact, was decided upon the factual assumption that 
there was a significant disparity in property values calculated t 
county as opposed to state assessors. Id. at 190, 193. This 
disparity was assumed to result from the fact that, while the 
State Tax Commission often used income or other valuation methods 
that gave "very little effect to the impact of inflation in the 
assessment process," the cost and comparable sales methods used 
most frequently by county assessors were "highly sensitive to 
inflation." Id. at 189, 190. The Court emphasized that the 
"factual premise that state valuation and county valuation were 
not uniform has not been attacked." Id. at 193. Indeed, the 
State Tax Commission "denied that all property under its 
jurisdiction was assessed at its current fair cash value and 
further denied that the plaintiff's property was assessed at 100 
percent of the current fair cash value." Id. at n.3. 
On the Pin Alaon record, therefore, the Court concluded that 
U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 was not facially invalid. Instead, the Court 
was "obliged to presume that there is a valid factual basis for 
the challenged statute;" i.e., elimination of a conceded disparity 
in the outcome of county and state assessments (681 P.2d at 
193-194): 
[T]he Legislature may seek to enforce the uniformity 
requirement of [Utah Const, art. XIII] § 3(1) by 
attempting to equalize the tax burden borne by those 
taxpayers who pay a greater tax in proportion to the 
value of their property than others. In permitting 
transaction costs to be deducted from appraisals based on 
comparable sales or cost appraisal method, the 
Legislature has neither departed from the "cash value" 
requirement of Article XIII, § 3(1), nor gone beyond its 
constitutional duty to "prescribe by law such regulations 
as shall secure a just valuation for taxation." Id. 
The Court may not indulge in a similar presumption here. On the 
contrary, the record in this case shows a clear constitutional 
35 
violation. 
35 The Court did invalidate a property tax "rollback" statute 
in Rio Alaom. That statute rolled the assessed value of 
"all locally-assessed real property" back to 1978 levels. 
681 P.2d at 194. The Court held the rollback statute 
unconstitutional because, "[t]o freeze the value of some 
properties at a given point in time, and not others, must 
necessarily result in nonuniform assessments." 681 P.2d at 
195. 
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B. Refusal To Apply U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 In Calculating 
The "Reasonable Fair Cash Value'' Of Amax's 
Property Violates The Company's Constitutional 
Right To A Uniform And Equal Rate Of Assessment 
Article XIII, Section 3(1) of the Utah Constitution requires 
the legislature to "provide by law a uniform and equal rate of 
assessment on all tangible property in the state, according to its 
value in money." This constitutional mandate has been interpreted 
as requiring reasonable equality and uniformity in the assessment 
of taxable real and personal property. Harmer v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 452 P.2d 876 (Utah 1969). As the Court noted in Rio 
Algom, the constitutional language "mean[s] that property should 
be valued 'as near as is reasonably practicable, at its full cash 
value; in other words . . . the valuation for assessment and 
taxation shall be, as near as reasonably practicable, equal to the 
cash value for which the property valued would sell in the open 
market . . . . ' " Rio Algom 681 P.2d at 190 (quoting State ex rel. 
Cunningham v. Thomas, 50 P. 615, 616 (1897)). Accord, U.C.A. 
§ 59-5-1 (1986) ("[a]11 taxable property, not specifically exempt 
under Article XIII, Sec. 2, of the Constitution of Utah, must be 
assessed at 100% of its reasonable fair cash value . . . " ) . 
Section 59-5-4.5 represents a legislative determination that 
certain assessment methods — specifically, the "cost'' and 
"comparable sales" methods — overstate the "reasonable fair cash 
value" of appraised property. The statute, therefore, gives a 2 0% 
reduction in the calculation of "reasonable fair cash value" when 
"the county assessor uses the comparable sales or cost appraisal 
method in valuing taxable property," Id. Whether a legislative 
classification that gives some — but not all — taxpayers an 
immediate 20% deduction meets the standards of equality and 
uniformity imposed by Article XIII, § 3(1) of the Utah 
Constitution is c:\estionable. Stillman v. Lynch, 192 P. 272, 279 
(Utah 1920). See Note, "Recent Developments in Utah Law," 1985 
Utah L. Rev. 131, 214 (1985) ("The fRio Alaoml decision has given 
the legislature a statutory means of mitigating the increase in 
property taxes, but the basis for mitigation is a statute that 
3 6 
arguably is unconstitutional"). Nevertheless, this Court 
concluded that U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 was not facially unconstitutional 
because — at least in some circumstances — there was "a valid 
factual basis for the challenged statute." 681 P.2d at 193. 
The "valid factual basis" for U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 identified by 
the Court in Rio Alaom flows from two legislative findings. 
36 The editors of the Utah Law Review concluded that, despite 
this Court's reasoning, U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 is 
indistinguishable from the property tax rollback statute 
held unconstitutional in Rio Alaom (1985 Utah L. Rev. at 
212) : 
The rollback statute was held unconstitutional because it 
caused property to be assessed at a value that, although 
originally based on market value, was less than market 
value. Although the court held otherwise, the eighty 
percent limitation [of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5] arguably has 
the same effect . . . . An argument . . . can be made 
that the eighty percent limitation statute also violates 
the uniformity and equality provisions of the 
constitution because it does not use the constitutionally 
prescribed market value as the basis for calculating the 
tax. 
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First, U.C.A. § 59-5-4,5 itself embodies a legislative 
determination that the comparable sales and cost appraisal methods 
include "various fees, services, closing costs, and other 
expenses" which "lessen the actual amount that may be received in 
the transaction." Id. Second, the legislative history of U.C.A. 
§ 59-5-4.5 suggests that the statute represents a legislative 
attempt to "equalize" the tax burden between state- and county-
assessed taxpayers. 681 P.2d at 193. Neither of these 
legislative findings, however, provides a "valid factual basis" 
for the constitutionality of the statute as applied to Amax. 631 
P.2d at 193. 
Initially, even assuming that the legislature is correct in 
finding that cost and market appraisal methods "overvalue" 
property by approximately 20% because those methods include 
37 . . . 
various fees and closing costs, that finding provides no 
legitimate basis for discriminating between state- and county-
assessed properties. After all, if county assessors using cost 
and market appraisal methods can be expected to overvalue property 
by approximately 20%, the same can be expected of state assessors 
38 
using the identical methods. Therefore, because all property 
3 7 The Court in Rio Alaom noted that, *[s]ince there is no 
claim in this case that the amount of the transaction costs 
provided for in U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 is factually arbitrary, 
the reasonableness of the amount of these costs is in effect 
conceded." 681 P.2d at 193. 
38 The state assessor here, in fact, asserted that he did not 
believe that his appraisal would diverge from values fixed 
by a county assessor. Tr. 152. 
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in the state must be assessed at a "uniform and equal rate" (Utah 
Const, art. XIII, § 3(1), the legislature cannot — without 
something more — give some properties assessed by means of cost 
and market methods a 20% break (i.e., properties assessed by 
counties) while denying that break to other, similarly assessed 
properties (i.e., properties assessed by the state). Stillman v. 
39 Lynch, supra, 192 P.2d at 279. 
"Something more" that might justify a distinction between 
state- and county-assessed properties could include a 
demonstrated, actual disparity between the outcomes of state- and 
county-conducted assessments. Indeed, it was this precise 
"something more" that supported the facial validity of U.C.A. 
§ 59-5-4.5 in Rio Alaom. There, the Court upheld the statute as a 
39 In Stillman, this Court struck down a property tax statute 
that provided a special deduction from the assessed value of 
bank stock. The reasoning of the Court is directly 
applicable to this case (192 P.2d at 279): 
The section under consideration plainly gives to bank 
stockholders a deduction given to no other class of 
taxpayers . . . . This is an exemption or deduction not 
accorded to other classes or groups of taxpayers, and is, 
therefore, beyond any question of doubt, repugnant to the 
Constitution, which provides for uniformity of taxation. 
Not only do we find no warrant in the Constitution that 
permits the deduction made by the Legislature, but, in 
our opinion, the deduction is prohibited by the 
Constitution, Suppose the legislature had enacted a law 
putting farmers in a separate class for purposes of 
taxation, and had given them a flat 20 per cent, 
reduction in the assessment of their property. Would any 
one question the invalidity of such a law? It would be 
rank and indefensible class legislation that could not 
possibly be harmonized with the Constitution. 
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valid legislative attempt to "equalize" state and local 
assessments. 681 P.2d at 193. But, as noted above, Rio Alaom was 
decided without a factual record and upon the presumption that a 
disparity between state and local valuations actually existed. 
Id. & n.3. This case, however, does not present a mere facial 
challenge. Moreover, unlike the situation in Rio Alaom, Amax has 
developed a record which demonstrates that, rather than 
"equalizing" tax burdens, the Commission's refusal to apply u.C.A. 
§ 59-5-4.5 in calculating the "reasonable fair cash value" of 
Amax's property "result[s] in nonuniform assessments" throughout 
Tooele County. Rio Alaom, 681 P.2d at 195. 
Amax's unequal access to the benefit of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 
cannot be justified by any assumption that taxpayers assessed by 
Tooele County "pay a greater tax in proportion to the value of 
their property" than Amax. Rio Alaom, 681 P.2d at 193. The 
record, in fact, unequivocally shows just the opposite. The 
"income" method of appraisal, which arguably diverges from 
appraisal methods used by county assessors (Rio Alaom, 681 P.2d at 
190, 193), has not been used to assess Amax's holdings. Instead, 
Amax's property has been assessed by means of cost and comparable 
sales data identical to that which would have been used by the 
Tooele County assessor. Tr. 152, 155-156, 202-203. The Property 
Tax Division employee who appraised Amax's property even asserted 
that his own appraisal would not differ from a county-conducted 
assessment. Tr. 152. And, unlike the situation in Rio Alaom, the 
Commission has never asserted that the value placed on Amax's 
property is less than "100 percent of the current fair cash 
value." 681 P.2d at 193 n.3. On the contrary, the Commission and 
its employees have strenuously argued that the valuation placed on 
Amax's property represents the property's full current fair cash 
value. Tr. 253.40 
Thus, the sole basis for denying Amax the 20% reduction 
embodied in U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 is the arid justification offered by 
the Commission: "The language of the section does not apply to 
property which is centrally assessed such as the subject 
property." Docketing Statement, Appendix 2 at 4 (emphasis added). 
The Commission's naked reliance upon the formal legislative 
classification of Amax's property as "centrally assessed," 
however, simply does not pass constitutional muster. "Certainly 
40 The record on this point is explicit (Tr. 253): 
Q [By Mr. Miller, attorney for Property Tax Division] 
Now, Mr. Stewart, in light of the testimony that you 
heard yesterday from AMAX and Mr. Edwards, do you feel 
that your evaluation of AMAX property for 1986 arrives 
at a fair market value? 
A [By John Stewart, appraiser, Property Tax Division] 
Referring to the figure of approximately $78 million? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes, I do. 
Q In light of the testimony that was offered by AMAX 
yesterday, are there any further adjustments that you 
wish to make in your valuation of AMAX for 1986? 
A None that I can think of that we've had a chance to 
review. 
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the Legislature nay not establish formal classifications of 
property that result in nonuniform or disproportionate tax 
burdens." Rio Alaon, 681 P.2d at 193. 
It is obvious that nothing except the formal classification of 
the Plant and the Ponds as "centrally assessed" supports the non-
applicability of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 to Amax. Amax is denied the 
benefit of a 20% deduction in calculating the "reasonable fair 
cash value" of its property simply because that property is 
assessed by a state rather than a county employee, and includes 
personal as well as real property. As a result, Amax has been 
required "to shoulder an unfair portion of the taxes" in violation 
of "the requirement of uniformity." Rio Alaom, 681 P.2d at 193. 
The record establishes beyond doubt the constitutional invalidity 
41 
of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 as applied to Amax. 
41 Amax, of course, recognizes that "[b]ecause of the 
necessity to use different methods for assessing different 
types of property, a certain degree of de facto 
classification is unavoidable." Rio Alaom, "31 P.2d at 191. 
The level of unequal, discriminatory classir^cation 
exemplified by the application of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 to the 
facts of this case, however, far exceeds any permissible 
level of de facto classification. The Court upheld the 
facial validity of the statute in Rio Alaom solely because 
it assumed that the income-based valuation methods 
presumably used by the Commission were more inflation 
sensitive (and therefore resulted in lower valuations) than 
the cost and comparable sales methods used by the counties. 
The 20% reduction accorded county properties therefore 
simply "equalize[d] the tax burden borne" by state- and 
county-assessed taxpayers. 681 P.2d 189-190, 193. Here, 
there is nothing to "equalize;" Amax's and county-assessed 
properties are valued by means of the same techniques. 
Therefore, application of the statute to county-assessed 
properties — but not to Amax — distorts rather than 
"equalizes" tax burdens within the county. 
Because refusal to apply U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 to Amax's property 
is "in violation of the principle of uniformity" (Rio Algom, 631 
P.2d at 195), Amax is entitled to the 20% reduction set forth in 
the statute. "The overarching purpose of §§ 2 and 3 of Article 
XIII [of the Utah Constitution] is to achieve uniformity in the ad 
valorem taxing scheme." Id., 681 P.2d at 194. Indeed, equality 
is "'the just and ultimate purpose of the law.'" Id. (quoting 
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43 S.Ct. 
190-192 (1923)). The only way that the fundamental goals of 
uniformity and equality can be met is by extension of the 20% 
deduction to all of Amax's property assessed by "cost" and 
"comparable sales" methods. U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5. As the Court 
recognized in Rio Algom (681 P.2d at 194) (quoting Kittery 
Electric Light Co. v. Assessors of the Town of Kitterv, 219 A.2d 
728, 734 (Me. 1966)): 
To assess property at its just value is only one of the 
fundamental requirements of law. The assessment must 
further represent the owner's equal portion of the 
burden of taxation, and if the assessors have not 
appraised at full value but only at a fixed percentage 
of true value, then such treatment must be uniform and 
equal on all real estate and tangible property, so much 
so that if both cannot be obtained then equality must 
prevail. 
42Cf. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43 
S.Ct. 190 (192 3) (bridge owner whose property was assessed at 
full value while surrounding properties were undervalued was 
entitled to have "his assessment reduced to the percentage of 
that value at which others are taxed;" the Court concluded that 
"where it is impossible to secure both the standards of the 
true value, and the uniformity and equality required by law, 
the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and 
ultimate purpose of the law"). See also Hillsborough Township 
v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946) (the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the individual from 
Footnote cont. 
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County-assessed properties valued upon the basis of cost and 
comparable sales data are entitled to a 20% deduction in 
calculating their "reasonable fair cash value." Amax's property, 
whether state or county assessed, is entitled to uniform 
treatment. 
Finally, Amax is entitled to the benefit of U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 
in calculating the "reasonable fair cash value" of all of its 
property — both real and personal. Just as there is no 
constitutionally permissible basis for formal classifications of 
state- and county-assessed property, there is no constitutionally 
permissible basis for formal classifications of real and tangible 
Footnote cont. 
state action that selects him out for discriminatory treatment 
by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same 
class); Maricopa County v. North Central Dev. Co., 566 P.2d 683 
(Ariz. App. 1977) (an intentional scheme which results in the 
assessment of the few "more prominent" construction projects 
violates equal protection); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County 
Assessor Etc., 592 P.2d 965 (N.M. 1978) (frequent revaluation 
of property where other properties in the county were not 
systematically revalued violated the taxpayer's right to equal 
protection). And see also Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. 
Eagerton, 472 F. Supp. 60, 64 (N.D. Ala. 1979) ("the Court 
concludes that the federal statute prohibiting tax 
discrimination against rail transportation property which 
became effective February 5, 1979 [The Railroad Revitalization 
Regulatory and Reform Act of 1976], requires the State of 
Alabama to reduce the assessment ration for railroad property 
to the assessment ratio of other commercial and industrial 
property for the 1979 tax year"); General American Transp. 
Corp, v. Com, of Kentucky, 791 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1986) (same); 
Burlington Northern Railroad Co, v. Dep't of Revenue of 
Wisconsin. 604 F. Supp. 1575 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (same); General 
Am. Transp. Corp. v. La. Tax Comm'n. 511 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. La. 
1981) (same); Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Louisiana 
Tax Com'n. 498 F. Supp. 418 (M.D. La. 1980); Tennessee v. 
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 478 F. Supp. 199 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1979) . 
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personal property which result in nonuniform treatment. Section 
59-5.4#5; moreover, makes no distinction between taxable real and 
taxable personal property. Rather, the statute requires a 20% 
reduction in value when the "cost" or "comparable sales" 
valuation method is used. Taxable property, of course, includes 
both real and tangible personal property. U.C.A. 59-2-102(10) 
(1988) (defining property as "property which is subject to 
assessment and taxation according to its value".) The 20% 
reduction provided by U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5, therefore, should apply 
to all of Amax's property that is valued by means of cost of 
43 
comparable sales appraisals. 
43 Amax would also direct the Court's attention to the fact 
that, although the 20% tax break for county assessed 
property is designed to be temporary, the statute in all 
probability will not die a natural death without a little 
nudge from this Court. The predecessor to the version of 
U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 at issue here had been repealed prior to 
the decision in Rio Alaom. Act of January 30, 1982, ch. 66, 
§ 6, 1982 Utah Laws 249. When re-enacted in 1984 following 
Rio Alaom, U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 was to have expired in 1986, by 
which time the Commission was to have developed uniform 
assessment methods for state and county assessors. Note, 
"Recent Developments In Utah Law," 1985 Utah L. Rev. 131, 
213 the "reenactment . . . is only temporary; . . . the 
State Tax Commission is to develop and implement comparable 
sales or cost appraisal methods that do not include 
transactional costs by January 1, 1986"). 
The Commission, however, has never developed the uniform 
assessment methods foreseen in 1984. The legislature, in 
response, has simply kept rolling back the expiration date 
of the statute. E.g.. House Bill 352 (1986) ; Senate Bill 71 
(1987); Senate Bill 59 (1988). The 20% tax break for 
county-assessed properties is currently set to expire in 
1990. U.C.A. § 59-2-304(2) (1988). The Commission and the 
legislature apparently lack the will to abide the uniformity 
and equality mandate of Article XIII, Section 3(1) of the 
Utah Constitution. This Court cannot be as flacid. 
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C. The Commission Must Assess Amax's Property 
At 80% Of Value To Avoid Improper Taxation 
Of Intangible Property 
Article XIII, Section 2(10) of the Utah Constitution provides 
that "[i]ntangible property may be exempted from taxation 
as property or it may be taxed as property in such manner and to 
sucn extent as the Legislature may provide, but if taxed as 
property the income therefrom shall not also be taxed." The 
legislature has elected to exempt intangible property from 
taxation as property and to tax the income therefrom. U.C.A. 
§ 59-1-1 (1986) . The Constitution and implementing statutes of 
the State of Utah, therefore, prohibit the taxation of intangible 
property for ad valorem tax purposes• 
The legislature has recognized that assessments based on 
comparable sales or cost appraisal methods include in the 
valuation the amount of various fees, services, closing costs and 
other intangible values. U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5. Ad valorem taxation 
of the value attributable to these intangibles would violate 
U.C.A. § 59-1-1 and Article XIII, Section 2(10) of the Utah 
Constitution. Consequently, county assessors are statutorily 
required to "take 80 percent of the value based on comparable 
sales or cost appraisal of the property as its reasonable fair 
cash value for purposes of assessment." U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5. 
Amax's property has been valued by means of the same cost and 
comparable sales methods employed by county assessors (Tr. 152), 
but the Commission did not reduce the appraised value of Amax's 
property by 20% to account for the intangible values described in 
U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 Tr. 154. Thus, the valuation methods used by 
the Commission have captured the nontaxable value of the 
intangible property described in U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 — a value 
which the legislature has set at 20% of the total value derived by 
these methods. Since the intangible property of Amax referred to 
in U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 is constitutionally and statutorily exempt 
from ad valorem taxation, Amax is entitled to a 20% reduction in 
the assessed value of its property — regardless of whether that 
property is assessed by the Commission or county assessors. 
CONCLUSION 
The final decision of the Commission should be reversed. The 
Court should direct that Amax's property is properly assessable by 
Tooele County and, accordingly, that U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5 controls 
the determination of the "reasonable fair cash value" of Amax's 
real and personal property. In the alternative, the Court sh^ -ild 
direct the Commission to calculate the "reasonable fair cash 
value" of Amax's real and personal property pursuant to the 
formula set out in U.C.A. § 59-5-4.5. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Mark K. Buchi 
David K. Detton 
Richard G. Wilkins 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
(801) 521-5800 
October 26, 1988 Attorneys for Petitioner 
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APPENDIX A 
The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-1 (1986) [now codified 
at Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-103(1), and 59-2-110-1 (2) (g) (1983)] 
provides: 
All tangible property in this state, not exempt under 
the laws of the United States or under the Constitution of 
this state, shall be taxed in proportion to its value as 
hereinafter provided. Intangible property shall be exempt 
from ad valorem assessment, levy and taxation, but nothing 
in this title contained shall be construed to prevent the 
inclusion of income from property whether tangible or 
intangible, in the basis of any tax upon, or measured by, 
income. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(1) (1988) provides: 
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and 
taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair 
market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise 
provided by law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101(2)(g) (1988) provides: 
(2) The following property is exempt from taxation: 
(g) intangible property. 
The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1 (1986) [now codified 
at Utah Code Ann. *§ 59-2-103 (1988)] provides: 
All taxable property, not specifically exempt under 
Article XIII, Sec. 2, of the Constitution of Utah, must be 
assessed at 100% of its reasonable fair cash value and 
that value must be reported on the tax notice mailed to 
the property owner as provided in Section 59-10-10. 
Adjustments, on forms prescribed by the tax commission 
under Subsection 59-5-46(4), shall be made to the 
reasonable cash value as provided in Article XIII, Sec. 2 
to reduce the value 25% on residential property for tax 
purposes. For purposes of the adjustment, residential 
property means any property used for residential purposes 
as a primary residence. Property used for transient 
residential use and condominiums used in rental pools 
shall not qualify for the residential exemption. No more 
than one acre of land per residential unit shall qualify 
for the residential exemption. Land and the improvements 
thereon must be separately assessed. School district 
unmet need computations for critical school building aid 
shall be determined as though the bonding capacity had not 
been increased because of changes in the assessment rate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103 (1938) provides: 
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and 
taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair 
market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise 
provided by law. 
(2) The fair market value of residential property shall 
be reduced by 25% representing a residential exemption 
allowed under Article XIII, Sec. 2, Utah Constitution. 
(3) No more than one acre of land per residential unit 
may qualify for the residential exemption. 
The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (1986) [now codified 
at Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-201 and 59-2-301 (1988)] provides: 
Pipelines, power lines and plants, canals and 
irrigation works, bridges and ferries, and the property of 
car and transportation companies, when they are operated 
as a unit in more than one county, all property of public 
utilities whether operated within one county or more, all 
mines and mining claims, and the value of metalliferous 
mines based on ten times the annual net proceeds thereof 
as provided in Section 59-5-57, and all other mines and 
mining claims and other valuable deposits, including lands 
containing coal or hydrocarbons, nonmetalliferous minerals 
underlying land the surface of which is owned by a person 
other than the owner of such minerals, all machinery used 
in mining and all property or surface improvements upon or 
appurtenant to mines or mining claims and the value of any 
surface use made of nonmetalliferous mining claims or 
mining property for other than mining purposes; must be 
assessed by the State Tax Commission as hereinafter 
provided; except that property assessed by the unitary 
method, not necessary to the conduct and which does not 
contribute to the income of the business shall be assessed 
separately. On January 1, 1986, all methods of assessment 
used by the State Tax Commission not in statue shall be 
changed so as to increase assessment values by a factor of 
2 
five. All taxable property not required by the 
Constitution or by law to be assessed by the State Tax 
Commission must be assessed by the county assessor of the 
several counties in which the same is situated. For the 
purposes of taxation all mills, reduction works, and 
smelters used exclusively for the purpose of reducing or 
smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by the owner 
thereof shall be deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or 
mining claim though the same is not upon such mine or 
mining claim. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1988) provides: 
(1) By May 1 the following property shall be assessed by 
the commission at 100% of fair market value, as valued on 
January 1, in accordance with this chapter: 
(a) all property which operates as a unit across 
county lines, if the values must be apportioned among more 
than one county or state; 
(b) all property of public utilities; 
(c) all mines and mining claims and other valuable 
mineral deposits; 
(d) all machinery used in mining, all property or 
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or 
mining claims, and the value of any surface use made of 
mining claims or mining property for other than mining 
purposes. For the purposes of assessment and taxation, 
all processing plants, mills, reduction works, and 
smelters which are primarily used by the owner of a mine 
or mining claim for processing, reducing, or smelting 
minerals taken from a mine or mining claim, shall be 
considered appurtenant to that mine or mining claim, 
regardless of actual location; and 
(e) in all cases where the surface of lands is owned 
by one person and the mineral underlying those lands is 
owned by another, the property rights shall be separately 
assessed to the respective owners. If the surface is used 
for other than mining purposes, the value of the surface 
shall be assessed by the assessor of the county in which 
the property is located. 
(2) The method for determining the fair market value of 
productive mining property is the capitalized net revenue 
method or any other valuation method the commission 
believes, or the taxpayer demonstrates to the commission's 
satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative of the fair 
market value of the mining property. The rate of 
capitalization applicable to mines shall be determined by 
the commission, consistent with a fair rate of return 
expected by an investor in light of that industry's 
3 
current market, financial, and economic conditions- In no 
event may the fair market value of the mining property be 
less than the fair market value of the land, improvements, 
and tangible personal property upon or appurtenant to the 
mining property. 
(3) Immediately following the assessment, the owner or 
operator of the assessed property shall be notified of the 
assessment. The assessor of the county in which the 
property is located shall also be immediately notified of 
the assessment, 
(4) Property assessed by the unitary method, which is not 
necessary to the conduct and does not contribute to the 
income of the business as determined by the commission, 
shall be assessed separately by the local county assessor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-301 (1988) provides: 
The county assessor shall assess all property located 
within the county which is not required by law to be 
assessed by the commission. 
The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5 (1986) [now 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304 (1988)] provides: 
(1) When the county assessor uses the comparable sales or 
cost appraisal method in valuing taxable property for 
assessment purposes, the assessor is required to recognize 
that various fees, services, closing costs, and other 
expenses related to the transaction lessen the actual 
amount that may be received in the transaction. The 
county assessor shall, therefore, take 80% of the value 
based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the 
property as its reasonable fair cash value for purposes of 
assessment. 
(2) (a) Prior to January 1, 1987, the State Tax 
Commission shall develop and implement comparable sales or 
cost appraisal methods in valuing taxable property for 
assessment purposes which provide that the various fees, 
services, closing costs and other expenses related to the 
sales transaction and other intangible values are not 
included as part of the reasonable fair cash value for 
purposes of assessment. 
(b) Beginning January 1, 1987, the provisions of 
Subsection (1) do not apply to county assessors using the 
sales or cost appraisal method in valuing taxable property 
for assessment purposes. For assessments beginning 
4 
January 1, 1987, the State Tax Commission shall by 
regulation order county assessors to use the comparable 
sales or cost appraisal methods which are rehired to be 
developed and implemented in Subsection (2)(- in place of 
the requirement of Subsection (1). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304 (1988) provides: 
(1) If the county assessor uses the comparable sales or 
cost appraisal method in determining the fair market value 
of taxable property for assessment purposes, the assessor 
is required to recognize that various fees, services, 
closing costs, and c:her expenses related to the 
transaction lessen the actual amount that may be received 
in the transaction. The county assessor shall, therefore, 
take 80% of the value based on comparable sales or cost 
appraisal of the property as its fair market value. 
(2) (a) Prior to January 1, 1990, the commission shall 
develop and implement comparable sales or cost appraisal 
methods in valuing taxable property for assessment 
purposes which provide that the various fees, services, 
closing costs, and other expenses related to the sales 
transaction and other intangible values are not included 
as part of the fair market value for purposes of taxation. 
(b) Beginning January 1, 1990, the provisions of 
Subsection (1) do not apply. Beginning January 1, 1990, 
the commission shall, by rule, order county assessors to 
use the comparable sales or cost appraisal methods which 
are required to be developed and implemented in Subsection 
(2)(a) in place of the requirement of Subsection (1). 
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